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INTRODUCTION
The reply brief of SA Group Properties, Inc. ("Plaintiff') resorts to sweeping
statements and generalities in the face of the overwhelming evidence that the Findings
and Order ,,,ere not supported by substantial evidence. Although Plaintiff accuses
Defendants of attempting to "mine[] the district court's order" and of "ignoring relevant
statements," in the Findings, 1 it is Plaintiff that has ignored the evidence and failed to
mention - or respond to-the majority of Defendants' carefully articulated and supported
points. The theme in Plaintiffs brief is the assertion that if the Trial Court made a
finding, then-ipso facto, the finding must be true. Although there is deference to the Trial
Court, Plaintiff's approach ignores well-established law in Utah that a trial court's
discretion is not unlimited, and its "findings cannot be made up out of whole cloth;
substantial, competent evidence must exist that supports the findings, and when a finding
of fact is not so supported, it must be rejected." 50 W. Broadway Associates v.

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989) (emphasis
added). This is that rare case where such evidence does not exist (and the Trial Court's
Findings are internally inconsistent and contradicted by the evidence -including
Plaintiff's own evidence).
Furthermore, Plaintiff's critique that Defendants have attempted to "nit-pie and
find fault with the minor aspects of the Trial Court's detailed Order" 2 is belied by the

1

[Brief of Appellee ("Plaintiff's Brief'), at 30].

2

[Plaintiff's Brief, at 30 (emphasis added)]. Plaintiff's reliance on American West
Bank v. Kellin, 2015 UT App 300,364 P.3d 1055 is misplaced. The facts of this case are
1
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number and import of the Trial Court's clearly erroneous Findings. Defendants
established in painstaking detail that the Trial Court's rejection of Cook's opinions were
based on three critical and clearly erroneous Findings that were not supported by
substantial evidence. 3
Finally, the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying Defendants' Motion to
Amend, including because of Plaintiff's one-year delay in producing documents.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the Trial Court's Judgement and Findings
and Order, and remand with instructions to allow Defendants to file and proceed with the
proposed amended counterclaim.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN REJECTING COOK'S
VALUATION AND ADOPTING JORGENSEN'S VALUATION
A.

COOK DID NOT USE AN UNRELIABLE VALUATION METHOD

The Trial Court clearly erred in rejecting Cook's opinion on the incorrect basis
that Cook used an unreliable valuation method called the "land-residual method."

vastly different from American West, where this Court rejected the appellant's arguments
that the trial court erred based on particular critiques of the bank's expert witness, which
were of a markedly different nature. Jd<JrcJI 26-27. Here, Defendants are not simply
relying on inconsistencies in the Findings and Order to seek reversal; instead, Defendants
have identified each of the Findings that are literally unsupported by the evidence and
upon which the Trial Court's rejection of Cook's opinion were based.
3

The Trial Court advanced three reasons - in bullet points - for rejecting Cook's
opinions. [Opening Brief, at 28-29]; [R.3758 (Cook gave "too much value" to the JIB
LOI, used an "un-established and unreliable" methodology," and did not value the
Property in its "as is" condition")].
2
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1.

Cook and Jorgensen Used the Same Valuation Methodology

Plaintiffs arguments that Cook used the land-residual method are unsupported by
the Record. [Plaintiffs Brief, at 31-33]. During trial, Jorgensen conceded that the
method used by Cook was not the same "technique" for which courts have shown
disdain. [Opening Brief, at 40]; [R.3854-56]. Despite this admission, Plaintiff attempts
to salvage Jorgensen's critique by citing Jorgensen's testimony that what Cook "used was
still a land residual technique" and that the "comment [was] still applicable to - to all
land residual techniques." [Plaintiff's Brief, at 32]. However, this overlooks Jorgensen's
complete testimony, in which Jorgensen admitted that he used the exact same technique
(i.e. the same land-residual technique) as Cook in evaluating the Property, for example,
with the Walgreen's parcel. [R.3857-58]. Indeed, Jorgensen even conceded that
"whatever critique [he] ha[d] for Mr. Cook's approach, then might similarly apply to
[Jorgensen's approach]."4 [R.3857-58]. Jorgensen's admissions were discussed in
Defendants' Opening Brief, 5 but Plaintiff did not address, let alone rebut, this critical
testimony, which renders the Trial Court's Finding literally unsupported. [Plaintiff's
Brief, at 31-33]. Thus, the Finding that a methodology was unreliable when applied by
Cook but reliable when applied by Jorgensen, in the face of unrebutted evidence
establishing that Jorgensen conceded that Cook did not actually use the disfavored
critique, and in fact both experts used the same, acceptable methodology, leads to the
4

Ironically, but importantly, if the critique is valid, then Jorgensen's valuation
must be rejected, and SA Group has no evidence to meet its burden, the Trial Court's
Findings are contrary to the evidence, and Defendants are not liable.
5

[Opening Brief, 40-42].
3
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"firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380,

«JI

17, 80 P.3d 553.

2.

Cook Did Not Value "Large Portions" of the Property Using a
Disfavored Methodology

Plaintiff mischaracterizes the evidence by arguing that Cook used an unreliable
methodology "to value large portions" of the Property. [Plaintiff's Brief, at 33]. There is
no evidence to support the assertion, and the only evidence establishes the opposite.
First, while Plaintiff implies that Cook used an unreliable methodology in valuing
the Anchor Pads, this is wholly unsupported by the evidence. During the second day of
trial, Cook plainly testified that he valued the Anchor Pads as commercial property. not
as multi-family, and that the value, whether commercial or multi-family, was identical.
[R.3493-95, 3616-17, 3653-54,]. Moreover, when questioned regarding Cook's valuation
of the Anchor Pads, Jorgensen candidly admitted that Cook "did it correctly for the
anchors" and that Cook did not value the Anchor Pads using the land residual method.
[R.3804-06, 3858-59]. In other words, the only evidence at trial - established through
Cook's and Jorgensen's testimony- was that Cook did not use a disfavored methodology
to value the Anchor Pads. Consequently, the Finding that Cook valued the Anchor Pads
using an "unestablished and unreliable valuation" methodology was clearly erroneous,
and was not supported by any evidence, 6 let alone substantial evidence.

6 Plaintiff has

no record citation that Cook valued the Anchor Pads using the landresidual methodology or rebutting Jorgensen's or Cook's testimony. [Plaintiffs Brief, at
31-33]. There is none, and Plaintiff's argument is not evidence.
4
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Second, Plaintiffs contention fails because Cook did not use an unreliable
methodology in evaluating Pad D, the Walgreen's parcel. Indeed, as discussed supra,
Jorgensen admitted that he used the same technique as Cook in valuing the Walgreen's.
[R.3857-58].
Finally, the Trial Court did not find, and Plaintiff has not advanced any argument
or identified any evidence to support, that Cook used an unreliable methodology to value
Lots 7, 8, 9, 10, Building A or half of Pad I. [See generally Plaintiffs Brief]; [R.375759]. The only lot or pad that Jorgensen claimed was valued using the land residual
method was the half of Pad I covered by the TIB LOI. [R.3804]. 7 However, Cook's
methodology in valuing the TIB LOI was not unreliable because it was the same
methodology Jorgensen used to value Walgreen's. Cook also testified to using the same
process for the TIB LOI as for Walgreen's. [R.3516-17].
In sum, Plaintiffs argument that Cook used an unreliable methodology to value
large portions of the Property is simply incorrect - at most it is one-half of one pad
(which was valued using the same methodology as Jorgensen). Accordingly, Finding
102(b) is not supported by substantial evidence and is therefore clearly erroneous.

7

Although Jorgensen initially testified that Cook used the land residual method on
the Anchor Pads and the Wal green's pad, he recanted this testimony on cross
examination when he admitted that Cook "did it correctly for the anchors" and that he
used the same methodology as Cook to value the Walgreen's pad. [R.3857-3859].
Plaintiff, not Defendants, is 'nit picking' the record, in an incomplete and misleading
fashion, hoping that the deferential standard of review will allow Plaintiff to gloss over
the details of the actual evidence, including Jorgensen's admissions.
5
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B.

COOK PERFORMED AN "As Is" APPRAISAL OF THE PROPERTY

The Finding that Cook did not perform an "as is" appraisal is unsupported by the
evidence and clearly erroneous. Rather than address the evidence that Cook performed
an "as is" appraisal - much of which was established by Plaintiff's own expert - Plaintiff
once again glosses over Jorgensen's admissions, ignores Cook's testimony and report,
and attempts to confuse the issues by arguing that 1) Cook's reliance on the JIB LOI was
'absurd,' 2) Cook relied on a hypothetical zoning change to value the Anchor Pads, and
3) there were other factors establishing that Cook did not perform an "as is" valuation of
the Property. [Plaintiffs Brief, at 32-38].
Plaintiff ignores the evidence, which establishes that Cook valued the Property in
its "as is" condition on the date of foreclosure. [R.4187 at 18.2, 18.63-18.66, 3491, 354750, 3568]. While Cook used certain assumptions to reach an "as stabilized" value, his
appraisal expressly states how the value added by the assumptions used to arrive at the
"as stabilized" value was subtracted in order to reach the "as is" value of the Property.
[R.4781, at 18.63-18.66]. This is a standard technique, and one followed by all three
experts. 8 While certain assumptions were used to reach an "as stabilized" value, Cook
deducted any additional value added by the assumptions in reaching his "as is" valuation.
[Compare R.4187 at 18.62 with R.4187 at 18.63-18.66]. The Trial Court's Finding that

Cook did not conduct an "as is" appraisal of the Property is clearly erroneous.

8

[R.4187 at 11-11 to 11-14, 10-7].

6
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1.

Cook's Reliance on the JIB LOI was Proper and Not 'Absurd'

Plaintiffs argument that Cook's reliance on the IlB LOI was 'absurd' ignores the
evidence. [Plaintiffs Brief, at 34-35].
While the Trial Court recognized that the JIB LOI added value to the Property~
albeit "marginal" value because "Defendants did not have title to the property,"9 it
ignored critical admissions by Jorgensen that valuing property is the valuation of property
rights not just land. [R.3867]. On cross examination, Jorgensen conceded that "if there's
a lease, there is a change in the property rights," and that in valuing the Property, Cook
was actually valuing "rights or potential rights from leasing the land," just as Jorgensen
had done in changing his valuation of the Walgreen's pad. [R.3868-70]. An LOI
increases the value of property rights, as was found by Plaintiff's own appraiser Liddell,
who relied upon LOI's in prior appraisals of the Property. [R.3407-08, R.4187 at 15.173,
16.90].
Despite this admission and the Finding that the JIB LOI added value, 10 the Trial
Court inexplicably rejected Cook's opinion because it gave "too much value" to the JIB
LOI. [R.3758]. In doing so, the Trial Court ignored Jorgensen's admissions that an
appraiser values property rights and that a lease, like the Walgreen's lease, or a letter of
intent, like the IlB LOI, alters the value of the underlying land. Cook was the only expert
to conduct any due diligence on the JIB LOI and he did not simply take the JIB LOI at

9

[R.3753].

10

[R.3752-3753].
7
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face value or ignore it as did Plaintiffs appraisers. 11 Among other things, Cook
considered unrebutted facts that the potential tenant was an existing and successful JIB
franchisee, the base terms of the lease were agreed-upon, and the high probability the
LOT would become a lease. [R.3518, 3771-74, 3779-88]. This approach was the same as
Jorgensen's, when he discovered the Walgreen's lease and adjusted his numbers to reflect
the rights conferred by the lease. [R.3870]. There was additional, unrebutted evidence as
to the strength and commitment of the JIB tenant, including that the JIB would have been
the first in northern Utah, the franchisee was planning on opening 30 store locations, and
had done business with the developer before. [R.3517-19, 3771-74].
Furthermore, Plaintiffs arguments - and the Trial Court's Findings - ignore
Jorgensen's admission that a rational seller would attempt to extract value from a buyer
for the JIB LOI. [R.3887]. Because the fair market value of property is defined as "the
amount at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable
knowledge of the relevant facts," 12 the law required the Trial Court to consider the value
increase from the JIB LOI. Further, the Trial Court initially rejected Liddell's appraisal

11

Liddell and Jorgensen admitted they did not consider the JIB LOI, let alone
conduct due diligence on the JIB LOI. [R.3267, 3400]. Thus, there was no evidence to
support their conclusions, and as noted, the attribution of zero value to the JIB LOI was
inconsistent with Liddell's prior valuations for Plaintiff. Plaintiff should not be allowed
to escape its prior positions simply because litigation makes them inconvenient.
12

Mallinckrodt v. Salt Lake City., 1999 UT 66, 'Il 10, 983 P .2d 566 (emphasis

added).
8
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for giving "no credence[] at all" to the existence of the nB LOI, 13 then inconsistentlyand clearly erroneously- concluded that Jorgensen's appraisal was more reliable despite
Jorgensen giving no credence at all to the JIB LOI. Neither the Findings nor Plaintiffs
Brief14 provide any basis for this inconsistent ruling, let alone substantial evidence
supporting the Finding. Accordingly, the Trial Court clearly erred in rejecting Cook's
opinion for giving value to the JIB LOI.

2.

Cook Did Not Rely on a Hypothetical Zoning Change for the
Anchor Pads

The Trial Court erroneously found - and Plaintiff continues to argue 15 - that Cook
valued the Anchor Pads using a hypothetical zoning change, even though the only
evidence is otherwise.
The Trial Court's confusion may arise from Plaintiffs proposed findings and
conclusions, 16 which erroneously and without evidentiary support argued that Cook
valued the Anchor Pads assuming a zoning change. [R.3732-33]. Plaintiff has now
"doubled down" on this incorrect position, by claiming that Cook's report contained "no

13

[R.3752-3753].

14

Plaintiff's only argument on this point is that the JIB LOI improperly increased
the value of the half of Pad I covered by the LOI. [Plaintiff's Brief, at 35-36]. However,
this argument misses the mark because it ignores the well-established principle that an
appraiser values property rights, not just land. [R.3867]. Because the JIB LOI had been
signed by a highly credit-worthy tenant, the value of Pad I was increased. [R.3518, 377174, 3779-88].
15

[Plaintiffs Brief, at 35-36].

16

Other of the errors in the Trial Court's findings stem from adopting Plaintiffs
proposed findings, which did not contain citations to the evidence - because the evidence
did not exist.
9
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analysis regarding the valuation of the Anchor Pads as commercial property." [Plaintiff's
Brief, at 35-36]. Presumably, Plaintiffs argument is not intentionally false, and is either
based on a failure to read the testimony and reports of both Cook and Jorgensen, or a
failure to understand them. However, under any scenario, Plaintiffs argument is wrong.
On pages 18.29-18.31 of his report Cook included an analysis of the Anchor Pads
using the sales comparison approach and expressly identified that he was valuing
commercial property, and not multifamily property.1 7 [R.4187 at 18.29-18.31]. During
the second day of trial, Cook explained he valued the Anchor Pads as commercial
property. not as multi-family, and that the value, whether commercial or multi-family,
was identical. [R.3653-54, 3493-95, 3616-17]. Cook's proper appraisal of the Anchor
Pads was further confirmed by Jorgensen, who testified that Cook "did it correctly for the
anchors." [R.3858]. Jorgensen further admitted, in both his report and during trial, that
Cook relied on the direct sales approach, not the residual approach including the
multifamily analysis, to value the Anchor Pads. [R.3858, R.4187 at 12-15]. Finally,
Cook's report expressly states that the zoning change "d[id] not affect the assignment
results because the value of the underlying land for commercial use is roughly the same
as the value of the underlying land for multifamily use." [R.3859, 4187 at 18.2

17

Although Plaintiff cites pages 3654-55 of the Record in support of its argument
that Cook relied on a zoning change in valuing the Anchor Pads, this is a miss-cite.
[Plaintiff's Brief, at 37]. This reference is only Cook's explanation that he included the
multifamily analysis to double check the value of the Property as commercial; he does
not in any way admit his valuation of the Anchor Pads as commercial property required a
rezoning.
10
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(emphasis added)]. Cook included a residual analysis regarding the viability of a
multifamily project only to test his work, a fact acknowledged by Jorgensen. [R.3859].
For these reasons, Plaintiffs argument that Cook relied on a zoning change comes
dangerously close to an attempt to mislead the Court, because it is not only unsupported
by the record, it is directly contradicted by the evidence, including the report and
testimony of Plaintiffs own expert.
Regardless, the Trial Court's Finding that Cook's opinion did not reflect an "as is"
appraisal because it assumed a zoning change on the Anchor Pads, was not supported by
any evidence, let alone substantial evidence.

3.

Plaintiff's "Other Factors" Do Not Demonstrate that Cook Did
Not Perform an "As Is" Appraisal

Plaintiff's final argument that Cook did not value the Property in its "as is"
condition relies on four "assumed ... conditions" that purportedly establish that Cook did
not do an "as is" appraisal. [SA Group's Brief, at 37-38]. However, these conditions
were previously debunked in Defendants' Opening Brief and Plaintiff has presented no
substantive response to Plaintiffs arguments or explanation of the evidence. [Opening
Brief, at 42-47]. Instead, Plaintiff ignores Defendants' points and contends that the only
thing that matters "is that the Trial Court found [the purported] assumptions affected the
credibility and reliability of Mr. Cook's valuation and made it less credible" than the
i ..)\

w

opinions of Plaintiffs experts. [Plaintiff's Brief, at 38]. In other words, Plaintiff argues
that it does not matter whether there was evidence, it only matters what the Trial Court

11
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found. While there is deference to a trial court, such deference does not go so far, and
this Court will still act as a check-and-balance.
Plaintiffs argument fails for numerous reasons, the most important of which is
that the argument is contradicted by the rule that "[a] trial court's findings cannot be
made up out of whole cloth; substantial, competent evidence must exist that supports the
findings, and when a finding of fact is not so supported, it must be rejected." Broadway,
784 P.2d at 1171 (emphasis added).
In this case, the "assumed conditions" cited by the Trial Court to reject Cook's
opinion were not based on evidence, but instead on Plaintiffs whole-cloth arguments.
For example, the assumption that the Walgreen's would be constructed was an
assumption that both experts used in order to arrive at the additional value generated by
virtue of the lease being signed. Both Cook and Jorgensen evaluated Pad D using the
identical methodology, which involved the assumption that a Walgreen's would be
constructed, after which the methodology was to back out costs to determine the actual
value of the lease. [R.3595-97, 3604, 3888, R.4187 at 12-7 (noting the assumption based
on the Walgreen's lease), 12-26 - 12-28 (analyzing construction costs of the
Walgreen's)]. Plaintiff has presented no argument to the contrary and cited no evidence
(because there is none) to support the Trial Court's Finding.
Moreover, the argument that Cook's appraisal was not an "as is" appraisal based
on the assumptions that the lease on Building A would be terminated and the Property

12
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would be leased to stabilized occupancy, 18 ignores not only Cook's testimony and
appraisal but also that of Plaintiff's own appraiser. Importantly, Liddell agreed with
Cook that the proper method to value Building A was through an income approach that
disregarded the non-arm's length lease and appraised the building as office space.
[R.4187 at 106.1, R.3350, 3411-12]. In doing so, both arrived at a virtually identical
value of price per square foot of Building A. [R.4187 at 106.1 (Cook's value at $21 psf;
Liddell's value at $20 psf]. Jorgensen's value is substantially lower, only $11.50 per
square foot based on the non-arm's length lease. [R.4187 at 106.1].
Finally, the Trial Court's Finding that Cook did not value the Property in its "as
is" condition based on the assumed subdivision of Pad I is also unsupported. [R.3759].
Jorgensen admitted that Cook's "assumption" of Pad I being subdivided was not really an
assumption at all, because it did not need to occur for the JIB to be built. [R.3881-83].
Jorgensen admitted that "whether the city approves the subdivision or not [is] irrelevant
to the analysis," thus rendering any critique of Cook on this basis entirely meaningless.
[R.3883 (emphasis added)]. 19

18

Cook assumed the Property would be leased to stabilized occupancy only as it
related to his "as stabilized" valuation. [R.4187 at 18.2, 18.63-18.66, 3491, 3547-50,
3568]. Although Cook's appraisal plainly shows two distinct values - an "as stabilized"
value and a separate identified "as is" value -Plaintiff submitted proposed findings
without citation to the evidence concluding that Cook did not do an "as is" appraisal,
which the Trial Court simply adopted. However, as established herein and in
Defendants' Opening Brief, Cook did perform an "as is" appraisal and the Trial Court's
rejection of his opinion on that basis was clearly erroneous. [Opening Brief, at 47].
19

Notably, Plaintiff concedes this point by failing to respond to Defendants'
discussion and citation to the evidence.
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C.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE To CITE To THE RECORD
DEMONSTRATES THE FINDINGS AND ORDER ARE NOT BASED ON
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Although Plaintiff argues that "a trial court's findings need not be meticulously
detailed," 20 this argument misses the point. While a trial court can make any number of
findings, it is beyond dispute that such "findings cannot be made up out of whole cloth"
and that they must be supported by "substantial, competent evidence." Broadway, 784
P.2d at 1171.
Here, it appears the Trial Court's failure to cite to evidence in its Findings and
Order arose from its reliance on Plaintiff's proposed findings and conclusions, which
were at worst incorrect and best unsupported by the evidence. Indeed, as discussed supra
and in Defendants' Opening Brief,21 Plaintiffs proposed findings and conclusions were
cursory, completely lacking in citations to the record, did not support the proposed
findings, and were actually contradicted by the evidence. [R.3732-35]. Perhaps if the
Trial Court had the benefit of citations allegedly supporting Plaintiff's proposed findings
and conclusions, rather than Plaintiff's arguments presented in conclusory fashion, it
would have discovered that Plaintiff's proposed findings -particularly the findings
regarding the Anchor Pads, Walgreen's, and whether Cook performed an "as is" appraisal
-were wholly unsupported by the evidence. Regardless, the Trial Court clearly erred in
adopting Plaintiff's proposed findings and conclusions because they were "made out of
whole cloth" and were not supported by any, let alone "substantial [or] competent
20

[Plaintiffs Brief, at 39].

21

[Defendants' Opening Brief, at 25-49].
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evidence." Broadway, 784 P.2d at 1171. Accordingly, the Findings and Order were
clearly erroneous and "must be rejected." Id.

D.

THE TRIAL COURT'S REJECTION OF COOK'S OPINION RESULTED
ADOPTION OF JORGENSEN'S OPINION

IN ITS

Defendants have acknowledged that challenging a trial court's findings of fact can
be a tall order, particularly in light of the dense record in this case. However, just
because it is difficult, does not mean it is impossible.
Plaintiffs principal argument is that because the Trial Court made certain
findings, those findings must be true or that given the deferential standard of review, this
Court is precluded from replacing its judgment for that of the Trial Court. [Plaintiff's
Brief, at 39-41]. However, Plaintiff ignores that both Defendants' Opening Brief and the
arguments herein, establish that the Trial Court's critiques of Cook - and the bases upon
which it rejected Cook's opinions - were not supported by substantial evidence (or any
evidence) and were actually contradicted by the only evidence in the record. While
Plaintiff glosses over - or outright ignores - the evidence, these errors lead to the "firm
conviction that a mistake has been made." Covey, 2003 UT App 380, <JI 17. This is
particularly true because the Trial Court's adoption of Jorgensen's opinions was based,
either in part or in whole, on its rejection of Cook's opinions. Despite this reality,
Plaintiff argues that because the Trial Court found Jorgensen's testimony to be reliable,
the clearly erroneous Findings regarding Cook do not matter. [See Plaintiffs Brief, at
39-41]. However, the two cannot be separated, as the rejection of Cook's opinion is
central to its Findings, including the adoption of Jorgensen's opinion.
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Additionally, the adoption of Jorgensen's opinion was clearly erroneous because
Jorgensen repeatedly drove down values, ignored the IlB LOI, and relied on properties
that were so old and dissimilar to the Property that they could not be deemed
"comparables." [Opening Brief, at 35-36, 49-55]. While Plaintiff responds that the Trial
Court found that Jorgensen "adequately compensated" for the dramatic differences in
quality and age "by increasing the value to the Highland Property to account for the
differences, " 22 this Finding - again - contained no citation to the record and even now on
appeal Plaintiff has still cited nothing to support such a Finding. 23 Instead, the Finding
was clearly erroneous because the use of such dissimilar properties involves too much
subjectivity and results in valuations that are simply not credible. 24 [R.3456, 3535-36].
In other words, the Finding that Jorgensen adequately compensated for his use of
properties that were twenty and thirty years older than the Property and had substantially
lower rent rates than the Property was clearly erroneous because it violated the rule of
substitution, a core concept of appraising. [R.3454-55, 3268-69, 3305-06].

22

[Plaintiff's Brief, at 40 (citing R.3760-61)].

23

Because this "court is not simply a depository in which [a] ... party may dump
the burden of argument and research," Plaintiffs failure to cite any evidence is fatal to its
arguments. Hampton v. Profl Title Servs., 2010 UT App 294, CJ{ 2, 242 P.3d 796.
24

During closing arguments the Trial Court acknowledged the importance of
correctly applying the substitution principle in considering "comps," criticizing
Jorgensen's "comparables" because "the demographics of the ... potential customers in
Alpine/Highland is really different than downtown Sandy. And the kind of business you
run and the kind of ... operation that you can manage is very different based on that
location. And you can't just simply plug an established fitness center from anywhere in
the state and say that's comparable and that's market rent, because it isn't. The
demographics make a difference." [R.4003-04]. No explanation - or evidence - for the
Trial Court's abrupt change in position has been offered by Plaintiff.
16
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Furthermore, although Plaintiff relies on the Finding that Cook's valuation "was
artificially inflated"25 to argue that the Trial Court did not clearly err in adopting
Jorgensen's opinion, the argument is circular at best. Plaintiffs argument is necessarily
premised upon the now-defeated and clearly erroneous Findings 102(a)-(c). Stated
differently, Plaintiffs argument is fundamentally flawed because the Findings giving rise
to the conclusion that Cook's opinion was inflated are not supported by substantial
evidence. Thus, the conclusion that Cook's valuation was inflated was without an
evidentiary basis.
Finally, Jorgensen's opinions were unreliable because he gave no value to the JIB
LOI, relied on outdated and vastly dissimilar properties to compare to the Property,
attributed more value to the building of the Walgreen's than obtaining the lease (after
intentionally or mistakenly failing to acknowledge the lease at all), applied an
unsupportable 25% discount to the Walgreen's lease, and repeatedly drove down the
value of the Property by using unsupported and unreasonably conservative choices, such
as keeping the non-arm's length lease with the fitness club, which approach was rejected
by both Liddell and Cook. [Opening Brief, at 52-55]; [R.4187 at 20.15, 106.1, 3288,
3350, 3411-12, 3450-51, 3453, 3519-20]. Importantly, even now, Plaintiff has not
identified any evidence to counter this evidence, and has again simply relied on the
unsupported Findings and Order.

25

[Plaintiff's Brief, at 41].
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E.

THE FINDINGS AND ORDER ESTABLISH THAT LIDDELL'S OPINION WAS
NOT MORE CREDIBLE THAN COOK'S OPINION

In a final effort to justify the rejection of Cook's opinion, Plaintiff argues that the
Trial Court found Liddell's opinion to be more credible than Cook's. This argument is
flawed for three reasons.
First, and once again, this argument is flawed because it is based entirely on
Findings 102(a)-(c), which are not supported by the evidence and therefore clearly
erroneous. [R.3757].
Moreover, the Finding that Cook's valuation was "less credible" than Liddell's
valuation 26 actually highlights the inconsistencies in the Findings and Order caused by
Plaintiff's submission of proposed findings and conclusion that were unsupported by the
evidence. For example, the Trial Court found numerous errors in Liddell's opinion,
including that "each of Mr. Liddell's judgments regarding the property were
conservatively made resulting in an appraised value that is not credible," Liddell failed
"to develop the approaches to value that are necessary to produce credible results,"
Liddell gave "no credence[] at all" to the IlB LOI, Liddell "used the wrong capitalization
rate twice, which resulted in a substantially lower appraised value," Liddell did not
attribute any value to the Walgreen's lease, and improperly applied a bulk sale discount
to the Property. [R.3751-55]. Each of these Findings included a citation to evidence.
The Court's subsequent, and unsupported Finding that does not cite to any
evidence, is at best unsupported. [R.3757]. While inclusion of Liddell's opinion in

26

[R.3757].
18
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Finding 102 was likely a mistake from Plaintiffs proposed findings, it does not matter27
because the Finding is not correct simply because the Trial Court made the Finding. "A
trial court's findings cannot be made up out of whole cloth; substantial, competent
evidence must exist that supports the findings, and when a finding of fact is not so
supported. it must be rejected." Broadway, 784 P .2d at 1171 (emphasis added). The
evidence - and the Findings - establish that Liddell's opinion was not more credible than
Cook's opinion. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot avoid reversal by attempting to take
advantage of a single line in the Findings and Order that is not supported by substantial
evidence.
Second, the Trial Court did not adopt Liddell's opinion, and thus Plaintiff cannot
rely upon an argument on appeal, based on a finding regarding Liddell, when no such
finding was ever made.
Third, and explaining why the Trial Court did not adopt Liddell's valuation,
Liddell admitted that his valuation was not the highest or actual value of the property and thus it was unusable. Liddell admitted that his methodology was dictated by the
client, he did not follow the methodology he would have typically used, he very rarely
used the methodology dictated by the client (about five percent (5%) of all appraisals),
and his valuation would have been higher if he had not appraised the Property as
instructed by the client. [R.3386, 3392-93, 3413]. In other words, Plaintiff cannot rely
upon an appraisal when even the appraiser has admitted the value is inappropriately low.
27

Except it should matter on appeal if a trial court adopts without critical analysis
incorrect or unsupported findings prepared by one party.
19
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In conclusion, the big picture flaws, the details, and minutia establish that the
Findings and Order are not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Findings
and Order must be rejected and reversed.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND

In refusing to grant Defendants leave to amend and add a counterclaim, the Trial
Court abused its discretion because "rule 15 should be interpreted liberally so as to allow
parties to have their claims fully adjudicated" and the "fundamental purpose of
liberalizing both pleading and procedure" is to afford parties "the privilege of presenting
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute." Timm v.
Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993). While the Trial Court denied leave to

amend based on its Findings that the Motion to Amend was not justified and was
untimely, such Findings were an abuse of discretion in light of the facts of this case,
combined with the liberal pleading standard and the "strong policy in [the Utah] rules of
civil procedure in favor of deciding cases on their merits rather than on procedural
technicalities." Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719, 723 (Utah 1996).

A.

THE MOTION TO AMEND WAS JUSTIFIED BASED ON SA GROUP'S
FAILURE TO TIMELY PRODUCE DOCUMENTS NEEDED TO CONFIRM THE
VIABILITY OF DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS AND IDENTIFY Wmcn
DRAW REQUESTS HAD NOT BEEN FUNDED.

Although "undue delay may be an appropriate justification for denying a motion to
amend" in "deciding whether a delay is undue, [courts] focus primarily on the reasons for
the delay." Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1313 (10th Cir. 2010). While denial of

20
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leave to amend is proper when there is no explanation for the delay, 28 leave to amend
"should be allowed if there is a reasonable explanation for the delay in discovering the
facts and the amendment is not unduly prejudicial to the opposing party." Chadwick v.

Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added).
Defendants' explanation for the timing must be considered in context. Plaintiff
admittedly took over a year to complete its documents production. Defendants were
extraordinarily patient and should not be punished for professional accommodation of
Plaintiff's requests for more time. Indeed, had Plaintiff completed its production
promptly, the Motion to Amend would have been filed eleven months or one-year sooner.
It is undisputed that this would have been timely under the Scheduling Order. 29
[R.0902]. Defendants gave a more than reasonable explanation for the delay in seeking
leave to amend, and the Trial Court's Finding of unreasonable neglect was an abuse of
discretion. 30 The Trial Court found that because the Defendants had some knowledge
that draw requests were not funded prior to the initiation of the lawsuit, "[n]o further
reliable confirmation was necessary to include allegations in a previous pleading."
[R.1680]. This Finding ignored the complicated nature of the loan transaction at issue in
this case, which involved numerous draw requests and disbursements made during the
time of the unpaid draw requests. [R.1659, 1661]. As explained at the hearing on the

28

Cohen, 621 F.3d at 1313.

29

Affirming the Trial Court under these circumstances will send a troubling
message to litigants - that they should delay producing damaging documents that would
support new claims until the last possible moment.
30

[R.1680].
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motion to amend, one of the principal reasons counsel waited until all the documents had
been produced and Plaintiff's Rule30(b )(6) witness had been deposed was because there
were numerous disbursements made around the time Draw Request 23 was submitted,
and the disbursements from the bank did not identify which draw request they ,·vere tied
to. [R.1659, 1661]. Defendants should not be punished because counsel accommodated
Plaintiff's excuses for delayed production and did not want to "shoot first and ask
questions later."
It is not unreasonable neglect for counsel to delay seeking to amend because
Defendants had not been able to confirm their belief that Plaintiff had breached the terms
of its agreement by failing to fund certain draw requests. 31 Indeed, the court in Swan

Creek Vill. Homeowners Ass'n v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, 134 P.3d 1122 summarized
Defendants' position perfectly, when it found that a "party's decision to hold off on
pleading those allegations until reliable confirmation could be obtained should not serve
as grounds for procedural default. " 32 Id. at en 22 (emphasis added); see also Kelly v. Hard

Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, en 38, 87 P.3d 734 (noting that "where the party's
prior knowledge was minimal. or where it was instead based on suspicious or
inconclusive evidence, the party's decision to hold off on pleading those allegations until
31

Plaintiffs contention that "Defendants had actual knowledge of the facts
supporting their proposed counterclaim since no later than 201 O" simply ignores
Defendants' explanation that it did not - and could not- confirm that failure to fund the
draw requests was a breach of the loan agreement until it had obtained the requested
discovery from Plaintiff. [Plaintiff's Brief, at 50-51]. In other words, Plaintiff attempts
to blame Defendants for not knowing information that was in Plaintiffs control.
32

This rule should apply with additional force where, as here, the other party
delays production of the documents necessary for "reliable confirmation."
22
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reliable confirmation could be obtained should not serve as grounds for procedural
default.").
Indeed, although Defendants initially moved to amend their pleading before the
end of fact discovery, 33 such motion had to be withdrawn based on the additional
discovery (i.e. the deposition of Plaintiff's 30(b)(6) witness which resulted in the
incredible situation in which Plaintiffs counsel had to point out information to the
witness, showing that certain draw requests had been paid) 34 which established that
Defendants had identified the incorrect draw request as unpaid. 35 Also notable, if
Plaintiff had produced documents earlier, the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition would have
occurred earlier. The fact that neither Plaintiffs 30(b)(6) witness or Defendants were
able to determine which draw request had not been funded until February 11, 2014, a
mere eight days before the end of fact discovery, only serves to further underscore the
reasonableness of Defendants' explanation for its delay in seeking leave to amend.
Accordingly, because Defendants provided a reasonable explanation for the delay
in bringing their motion to amend, the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying
Defendants' motion.

33

[R.1180-81].

34

[Opening Brief, at 18-19]; [R.1497-1500]. If Plaintiffs own Rule 30(b)(6)
witness was confused as to which draw requests had been paid, then Defendants should
not be held to have a duty to know more than the bank. These facts reflect a fundamental
unfairness to Defendants.
35

With the additional information, Defendants identified the unpaid draws and
filed a new motion to amend.
23
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B.

THE MOTION TO AMEND WAS T™ELY

The Trial Court abused its discretion when it found that Defendants' Motion to
Amend was not timely filed because it ignored Plaintiffs failure to timely produce
documents, failed to acknowledge the complicated nature of the issue~ and failed to
recognize that Defendants were entitled to vet their claims through the documents before
alleging a counterclaim.
Although Plaintiff argues that Defendants had "actual knowledge of the alleged
counterclaims no later than 2010,"36 this argument ignores the complicated loan
transaction at issue in this case, Defendants' need to know the details and bases for
Plaintiffs failure to fund the draw request, and Defendants' inability to determine which
draw request had not been funded without discovery. In short, the crux of Plaintiff's
argument - and the Trial Court's denial of leave to amend - turns on whether Defendants
were justified in seeking to confirm their counterclaims before bringing them. As
explained supra and in Defendants' Opening Brief, Defendants were justified in their
delay based on, among others, Plaintiff's repeated delay in producing documents.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs contention that the Motion to Amend was untimely
because of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is not supported by the case law.
Although Kelly included examples of when a motion was untimely, such as when the
motion was "filed one month after summary judgment had already been granted, ,m this
does not stand for the broad proposition that all motions to amend are untimely if filed
36

[Plaintiffs Brief, at 45].

37

Kelly, 2004 UT App 44, <JI 29.
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after a summary judgment motion. 38 Indeed, if such were the case, a party could prevent
future motions to amend by simply filing a motion for summary judgment early in the
proceedings. Obviously, Plaintiffs attempt to create a hardline rule requiring denial of
motions to amend after the filing of a motion for summary judgment \\1ould be
unworkable and is contrary to the well-established law in Utah that a court must analyze
the timeliness, justification, and undue prejudice factors on a motion to amend. See
Kelly, 2004 UT App 44 'II 26.

Finally, Defendants' Motion to Amend was timely because it was not filed years
into the litigation process. This case had been pending less than two years when
Defendants sought leave to amend, a period well before the three to twelve year periods
described in Kelly. See id., 'II 30.
C.

PLAINTIFF WOULD NOT HAVE EXPERIENCED UNDUE PREJUDICE IF
LEAVE TO AMEND WAS GRANTED

Plaintiff's prejudice argument is at most an argument of inconvenience, not the
"strong" or "undue" prejudice that must be shown to deprive a party of its right to pursue
meritorious claims. Such "a showing of simple prejudice is not enough to support a
denial of a motion to amend." Kelly, 2004 UT App 44, CJ[ 31. Instead, "[t]he fact that an
amended pleading may require the [opposing party] to conduct additional discovery does
not, alone, constitute sufficient grounds to justify the denial of a motion to amend." Id.
38

Notably, in Neztsosie v. Meyer, which Kelly cites in support of this proposition,
the facts establish that in addition to the motion to amend being filed after summary
judgment, the original complaint had been filed three years before the motion to amend
and the party had already amended their complaint once. 883 P.2d 920, 920-22 (Utah
1994). Such is obviously distinguishable from this case which had only been pending for
two years and no prior motion for leave to amend had been granted.
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Here, the only prejudice Plaintiff identifies was the need to conduct additional
discovery. This is exactly the type of "simple prejudice" courts have rejected as being
insufficient to support a denial of a motion to amend, and the Trial Court in fact correctly
rejected this argument, noting that "Plaintiff would not experience undue prejudice" if the
Motion to Amend was granted. [R.1679]. Plaintiff has not challenged on appeal, much
less demonstrated an abuse of discretion, regarding the Trial Court's Finding of no
prejudice.
In sum, the Trial Court abused its discretion when it incorrectly found that
Defendants' Motion to Amend was untimely and was not justified.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the Trial Court's Judgement
and Findings and Order, and remand with instructions to allow Defendants to file and
proceed with the proposed amended counterclaim.
DATED this 10th day of August, 2016.
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